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Economic choices are strongly influenced by whether potential outcomes entail gains
or losses. We examined this influence of outcome valence in an economic risk task.
We employed three experiments based on our task, each of which provided novel
findings, and which together better characterize and explain how outcome valence
influences risky choice. First, we found that valence perturbed an individual’s choices
around that individual’s base-level of risk-taking, a base-level consistent across time, and
context. Second, this perturbation by valence was highly context dependent, emerging
when valence was introduced as a dimension within a decision-making setting, and
being reversed by a change in task format (causing more gambling for gains than
losses and the reverse). Third, we show this perturbation by valence is explicable by
low-level approach-avoidance processes, an hypothesis not previously tested by a causal
manipulation. We revealed such an effect, where individuals were less disposed to choose
a riskier option with losses when they had to approach (go) as opposed to avoid (nogo)
that option. Our data show valence perturbs an individual’s choices independently of
the impact of risk, and causally implicate approach-avoidance processes as important in
shaping economic choice.
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INTRODUCTION
The valence of potential outcomes, that is whether they reflect
gains or losses, influences economic choices (Samuelson, 1963).
A prevailing view is that outcome valence determines attitude
to risk in a specific fashion, such that individuals are risk-averse
with gains and risk-seeking with losses (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). However, mounting evidence for an asymmetric process-
ing of rewards and punishments in humans and other animals
(Dayan and Seymour, 2008), has led to a questioning of this
relationship. Instead, we suggest that valence influences choice
independently of risk. This is evident in the fact that changing
the task format can lead one group of subjects to gamble more for
gains than losses, and another group to gamble more for losses
than gains, where the overall amount of gambling was similar
between the two groups (Wright et al., 2012). Here we sought to
better characterize this behavior in two experiments. First, instead
of comparing two different groups of subjects, we looked within
individuals to characterize context dependence in responses to
valence. Our rationale was that a priori it is unclear if the influ-
ence of risk and the influence of valence would be consistent
within individuals, or if instead the pattern seen in our previ-
ous study only emerged at the group level. If the overall amount
of risk-taking was consistent within individuals across contexts,
this would provide a clearer basis for interpreting valence effects.
Second, we compared two potential ways in which the influence
of valence may emerge: either as a generic effect of trial type (e.g.,
trials with gains or trials with losses), or only when individuals
were required to evaluate valence as an additional dimension in
choice. Thus, in these two experiments we hypothesized that an
individual would exhibit a consistent base-level of risk-taking,
around which the introduction of valence as a dimension in
choice would additionally perturb choice.
Furthermore, a biologically-based perspective on choice also
suggests that one source for such a perturbation of choice
by outcome valence derives, at least in part, from reflexive
“Pavlovian” approach-avoidance processes. In simple instru-
mental tasks these underlie important valence effects, evident
in a close coupling between punishment and nogo (avoid)
responses, and between reward and go (approach) responses
(Breland and Breland, 1961; Gray and McNaughton, 2000;
Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2012).
However, in economic choice there exists only correlational
evidence of a role for approach-avoidance, for example in
longer reaction times for losses compared to gains (Dickhaut
et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2012). Here we sought to directly
manipulate approach-avoidance processes in economic choices,
by harnessing the specific couplings between go/nogo and
reward/punishment. We hypothesized that the perturbation
induced by valence would depend on whether choice implies
approach or avoidance.
We tested these hypotheses in three independent experiments
(total n = 95), each using variations on an economic task that
orthogonally manipulates valence and risk (measured as vari-
ance) in potential outcomes. We asked if individuals show a con-
sistent base-level of risk-taking around which introducing valence
as a dimension in choice perturbs choice (Experiments 1 and 2),
and sought direct evidence implicating approach-avoidance in
the perturbation of economic choice by valence (Experiment 3).
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EXPERIMENT 1: VALENCE PERTURBS AN INDIVIDUAL’S
CHOICE ABOUT THEIR CONSISTENT BASE-LEVEL OF
RISK-TAKING
In Experiment 1 we took a within individual approach to charac-
terize context dependence in responses to valence, enabling new
questions not addressable in between subject designs (Wright
et al., 2012). Our rationale was that a priori it is unclear if
the influence of risk and the influence of valence would be
consistent within individuals, or instead in our previous study
the observed pattern only emerged at the group level. If the
overall amount of risk-taking was consistent within individuals
across contexts, this would provide a clearer basis for interpret-
ing valence effects. This within-individual approach enabled us
to ask if there was a consistent base-level of risk-taking for an
individual, despite changing task format so valence caused more
gambling for gains than losses or the opposite; and whether
valence perturbed an individual’s choices around that base-level
of risk-taking. Further, we could ask if the degree to which
valence perturbed an individual’s choices differed between con-
texts (i.e., it did not only reverse within individuals), which
may suggest distinct aspects to the valence effect between these
contexts.
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty healthy participants took part (mean 24 years, range
17–38; 13 male; 29 right handed). All provided informed consent.
University College London Ethic Committee approved the study.
TASK
Participants attended two separate sessions 5 days ± 0.2 (SD)
apart. On each day they completed one of two versions of a
risk task: on one attendance they completed an “accept/reject”
task; and on the other a “selection” task. Work in separate
groups of subjects suggested the accept/reject task led to more
gambling with gains than losses, and the selection task to
the reverse (Wright et al., 2012). Task order was counterbal-
anced between subjects (13 completed the accept/reject task
first).
In the “accept/reject” task (Figures 1A–C), in each trial partic-
ipants chose to accept or reject a lottery (four possible outcomes)
compared to a sure option (£6 in “gain trials”; £-6 in “loss trials”).
Each trial began with a fixation cross presented for 1–2 s (mean
1.5 s); followed by viewing the options for 4020ms; and finally
a black square appeared to indicate participants had 1500ms
to input their choice by button press (press “G” for gamble or
“S” for sure; the black square turned white when they chose).
If participants did not respond they received £0 on a “gain
trial” and the maximum loss possible on a “loss trial” (£-12).
There were 100 “gain trials” [all possible outcomes between £0
and 12, details in Wright et al. (2012)] in which we paramet-
rically and orthogonally manipulated the difference in risk (10
levels of difference in variance) and expected value (EV; 10 lev-
els) between the two options in each trial (Figure 1C). This
trial set was multiplied by −1 to give 100 “loss trials” (out-
comes ≤ £0) that were perfectly matched in their parametric
modulations of risk and EV. All 200 trials were presented in
random order.
The “selection” task (Figures 1E,F) was identical except that
on every trial individuals evaluated two simultaneously pre-
sented lotteries (each with two possible outcomes, all £0–12)
and selected between them (with a left or right button press
to select left or right lottery). Again in 100 “gain trials” we
parametrically and orthogonally manipulated the difference
in risk (10 levels) and EV (10 levels) between the two lot-
teries. As before, we multiplied all amounts by −1 to give
100 “loss trials”. All 200 trials were presented in random
order.
Participants began each session with an endowment of £12.
After the session, one “gain trial” and one “loss trial” were picked
at random and their outcomes were added to this endowment
to determine payment for that session. Participants could receive
between £0 and 24 per session (i.e., £0–48 in total). Participants
received all feedback and payment after the second attendance.
RESULTS
Individuals’ base-level of risk-taking was highly consistent across
tasks, both within individuals (Figure 2B) and across subjects
(Figures 1D,G and 2A). In both tasks, a simple metric for the
influence of risk on choice is the proportion of riskier choices
made (PropRisk; where risk-neutral = 0.5; risk-averse <0.5; risk-
seeking>0.5). An individual’s base-level of risk-taking was highly
consistent between tasks (r = 0.6, p < 0.001; Figure 2B). This
consistency was also shown across subjects, with risk aversion
in both the accept/reject task [PropRiskall 0.35 ± 0.15 (SD); one
sample t-test against risk neutral, t(29) = −5.47, p < 0.001] and
the selection task [PropRiskall 0.38 ± 0.11; one sample t-test
against risk neutral, t(29) = 5.56, p < 0.001], and this did not
differ between tasks (paired samples t-test, t = −1.4, p = 0.17;
Figure 2A).
Valence perturbed choice about this base-level of risk-taking
in both tasks, but did so in opposite directions depending on
task (Figures 1D,G). In the accept/reject task individuals gambled
more for gains (PropRiskgain 0.38 ± 0.16) than losses [PropRiskloss
0.32 ± 0.16; mixed analysis of variance [ANOVA] with factors of
2 valence [gains, losses; within-subjects] by 2 task order [between
subjects], main effect of valence F(1, 28) = 6.9, p = 0.014; no
interaction]. This effect was reversed in the selection task where
individuals gambled more for losses (PropRiskloss 0.44 ± 0.2)
than gains [PropRiskgain 0.33 ± 0.16; 2 valence by 2 order mixed
ANOVA, main effect of valence, F(1, 28) = 4.57, p = 0.041; no
interaction]. However, the degree to which valence influenced
an individual’s choices (ImpValence = PropRiskgain-PropRiskloss)
was not consistent within individuals between the tasks (r = 0.08,
p = 0.66; Figure 2C; i.e., not negatively correlated), suggesting
the possibility of distinct aspects to the valence effect between
these contexts.
A further dissociation of risk and valence effects was suggested
between subjects by the lack of correlation between measures
relating to each on individuals’ choices (PropRiskall v. ImpValence:
accept/reject, r = 0.00; p = 0.99; selection, r = −0.25; p = 0.18;
Figure S1). In both tasks reaction times were slower to choose
losses than gains, and behavioral modeling of choice confirmed
that EV, risk, and valence influenced choice (Supplementary
Results).
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FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1: dissociating valence and risk related
influences using task design. In the “accept/reject” task: (A) In each “gain
trial” individuals either accepted a lottery (four possible outcomes, all ≥0) or
rejected and so received £6 for certain. (B) A set of 100 “gain trials”
parametrically and orthogonally manipulated lottery risk and EV. Half the
lotteries had an EV above the sure amount and half below, so the proportion
of riskier choices indexed risk preference (PropRisk; risk-averse <0.5;
risk-neutral = 0.5; risk-seeking >0.5). (C) Multiplying all “gain trial” amounts
by −1 gave 100 “loss trials”. All 200 trials were presented in random order.
(D) Behavior: Individuals were risk-averse overall (i.e., PropRiskall <0.5).
Valence influenced choice, with more gambling for gains than losses. In the
“selection” task there were: (E) 100 “gain trials” with parametric and
orthogonal manipulation of difference in risk and EV between the two
options; and (F) 100 “loss trials” created as before. However, here in each
trial individuals were presented with two lotteries to consider and select
between. (G) Behavior: risk-aversion overall was unaltered compared to the
“accept/reject” task, but the direction of the valence effect was reversed.
Error bars show s.e.m. ∗P < 0.05.
EXPERIMENT 2: INTRODUCING VALENCE AS A DIMENSION
IN CHOICE
We next tested individuals in a within-subjects design on the
accept/reject task across three sessions: one in which all tri-
als involved only gains (GainAlone), one with losses alone
(LossAlone), and one where gain and loss trials were randomly
interleaved as before (CombinedValence). This enabled us to com-
pare two potential ways in which a perturbation by valence may
emerge. One was as a generic effect of trial type, such that
the valence effect would be seen between sessions (e.g., more
gambling in the GainAlone than LossAlone session) as well as
within the CombinedValence context. Alternatively, risk-taking
could be consistent between sessions (i.e., equal in GainAlone and
LossAlone), and instead the valence perturbation could emerge
in the CombinedValence context where interleaved gain and loss
trials required individuals to evaluate valence as an additional
dimension in choice.
PARTICIPANTS
Data from 26 participants (mean 25 years, range 19–32; 10 male;
25 right handed) were included, with three further participants
excluded (one deterministically only rejected and two made a
high proportion of non-responses).
TASK
Participants attended on three separate occasions (each 7± 1 days
apart). They completed a different version of the accept/reject task
on each attendance: once in a GainAlone context with the set of
100 gains trials presented twice (i.e., 200 trials total); once in a
LossAlone context with the set of 100 loss trials presented twice
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FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1: consistent base-level of risk-taking within
individuals. (A) Across subjects risk-taking was consistent between the
accept/reject task and selection tasks, despite reversing the direction of the
valence effect. (B) This consistent base-level of risk-taking was also seen
within individuals. (C) The valence effect was not correlated within individuals
between the two tasks.
(200 trials total); and once in aCombinedValence context with 100
gain trials and 100 loss trials (i.e., as in Experiment 1; 200 trials
total). Task order was counterbalanced between subjects (≥4 par-
ticipants for each of six possible orders). In order to keep the range
of possible outcomes between £0 and 24 in all three contexts, in
theCombinedValence context there was an endowment of £12 to
which one gain and one loss trial outcome was added as above;
GainAlone context a £0 endowment to which two gain trial out-
comes were added; and in the LossAlone context a £24 endowment
to which two loss trial outcomes were added. Participants received
all feedback and payment after the third attendance.
RESULTS
Individuals’ base-level of risk-taking was highly consistent
across all three contexts. This was seen within individu-
als, with PropRiskall highly correlated across the three con-
texts (all pairwise comparisons between contexts r > 0.7 and
p < 0.001, further details in Figures 3B–D and Supplementary
Results). Across subjects, there was no difference in the pro-
portion of risky choices (PropRiskall) between the three contexts
[CombinedValence 0.43 ± 0.2; LossAlone 0.4 ± 0.14; GainAlone
0.38 ± 0.2; One-Way ANOVA, F(2, 50) = 1.56, p > 0.2; no signif-
icant pairwise t-test; Figure 3A] and there was risk-aversion in all
three contexts (Supplementary Results).
However, introducing valence as a dimension in choices in
the CombinedValence context (i.e., the standard accept/reject
task in Experiment 1) revealed exactly the same perturba-
tion by valence about the base-level of risk-taking seen before,
such that individuals gambled more for gains than losses
(CombinedValence: gain 0.47 ± 0.2; loss 0.39 ± 0.16); [t(25) =
3.02, p = 0.006; Figure 3E]. For completeness, we note there was
no difference in rates of gambling between the CombinedValence
loss trials and LossAlone context [t(25) = 0.7, p = 0.5], but there
was a difference in gambling between the CombinedValence gain
trials and GainAlone context [t(25) = 3.2, p = 0.003].
Reaction times also suggested that rather than a generic effect
of trial type, instead the valence perturbation emerged in the
CombinedValence contex where individuals evaluated valence as
an additional dimension in choice. RTs did not differ between
the GainAlone (462 ± 88ms) and LossAlone [480 ± 112ms;
t(25) = −0.8, p = 0.4] sessions, but there was a large effect of
valence in the CombinedValence context [gains 485 ± 100ms;
losses, 560 ± 109ms; t(25) = −6.3, p < 0.001]. Further, whilst
there was no difference between the types of gain trial [t(25) =
1.04, p > 0.3] there was between the types of loss trial [t(25) =
3.25, p = 0.003]. However, we note that when analysing these
RT data in an ANOVA with factors of 2 context type (combined
and separate) by 2 valence (gain and loss), although there were
main effects of valence [F(1, 25) = 17.09, p < 0.001] and context
type [F(1, 25) = 7.96, p = 0.009], the interaction showed only a
trend-level significe [F(1, 25) = 3.74, p = 0.06]. Further details in
Supplementary Results.
EXPERIMENT 3 MANIPULATING APPROACH-AVOIDANCE
PROCESSES IN THE PERTURBATION BY VALENCE
In Experiment 3 we asked if the perturbation by valence, and its
context-dependence shown in Experiment 1, were derived from
approach-avoidance processes. Here we sought to directly manip-
ulate approach-avoidance processes by harnessing the specific
“Pavlovian” couplings between go/nogo and reward/punishment.
We examined this go/nogo manipulation in separate groups
who undertook modified versions of the accept/reject task
(Experiment 3a) and selection task (Experiment 3b), which can
be readily compared in Figures 4, 5.
EXPERIMENT 3a: GO-NOGO ACCEPT/REJECT TASK
Participants
Data from 17 participants (mean 23 years, range 19–35; 6 male;
15 right handed) were included (two further deterministic par-
ticipants who always gambled in gains and never in losses were
excluded).
Task
Each trial was identical to the accept/reject task above except for
the action by which individuals expressed their choice. As before,
they viewed the options for 4020ms, after which the black square
appeared to signal they had 1500ms to choose. Instead of indi-
cating choice by two different button presses, here participants
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FIGURE 3 | Experiment 2: consistent base-line risk-taking within
individuals and additional perturbation by introducing a valence as a
dimension in choice. A consistent base-level of risk-taking in the
accept/reject task was seen in the three contexts (A) across subjects and
(B–D) within individuals. (E) The perturbation by valence emerged within the
setting with both gain and loss trials. Error bars show s.e.m. ∗∗p < 0.005.
FIGURE 4 | Experiment 3a: go-nogo manipulation in the accept/reject
task. (A) Trials were identical to the accept/reject task above, except
here participants could either go (button press) or nogo (no button
press). In one block (GoRiskier), participants had to go to accept the
risky option or nogo to reject. In the other block (NogoRiskier),
participants had to nogo to accept the risky option or go to reject it.
(B) Individuals were averse to accepting (approaching) the risky option
with losses, and chose it less frequently when they had to approach it
(go) than avoid it (nogo). There was no effect of action in the gain
trials. Error bars show s.e.m. ∗∗p < 0.005.
could either respond with go (button press) or nogo (no button
press) (Figure 4A). Participants undertook two separate blocks.
In one block (GoRiskier), participants had to go to accept the
risky option (upon which it increased in size) or nogo to reject. In
the other block (NogoRiskier), participants had to nogo to accept
the risky option or go to reject it (upon which it decreased in
size). The order of blocks was counterbalanced between subjects
(9 participants GoRiskier block first).
This experiment used a set of 49 “gain trials” (as above but with
7 levels of EV and 7 levels of variance). Forty nine loss trials were
created by multiplying all amounts by −1. In each block the 49
gain and 49 loss trials were randomly interleaved as above (i.e., 98
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FIGURE 5 | Experiment 3b: go-nogo manipulation in the selection task.
(A) To indicate in each trial which lottery would be selected by a go and which
by a nogo response, the black square signaling the choice period appeared on
one of the lotteries, and individuals responded by either accepting or rejecting
it. In one block, individuals were instructed to go to accept the lottery with
the black square. In the other block, individuals would no-go to accept the
lottery with the black square. In each trial the lottery to be accepted or
rejected could be either the riskier or less risky lottery, so choices may again
be parsed as either: go to accept the riskier option (GoRiskier); or nogo to
accept the riskier option (NogoRiskier). (B) For the go-nogo manipulation we
see the same pattern as in the previous experiment: individuals chose the
risky option with losses less frequently when they had to go to accept
(GoRiskier) than nogo to accept (NogoRiskier). There was no effect of action
in the gain trials. Error bars show s.e.m. ∗∗p < 0.005.
trials per block, giving 196 in the whole session). Payment was as
above (endowment of £12, plus the outcomes of one gain and one
loss trial; range of possible outcomes £0–24), with all feedback at
the end of the session.
Results
Individuals chose the risky option less for losses than gains over-
all (Figure 4B; ANOVA below), which we hypothesized to arise
because individuals were averse to accepting the risky option
with losses. We predicted that this effect would be exacerbated
by the go-nogo manipulation, and therefore individuals would
choose the risky option with losses less frequently when they
had to approach (go) rather than avoid it (nogo). We observed
this precise effect: individuals chose the risky option with losses
less frequently when they had to go to accept (in the GoRiskier
block PropRiskloss 0.35 ± 0.16) than nogo to accept [in the
NogoRiskier block PropRiskloss 0.47 ± 0.16; t(16) = −3.39, p =
0.004; Figure 4B]. This effect of action was selective, with no dif-
ference seen in the gain trials [GoRiskier block PropRiskgain 0.54±
0.14; NogoRiskier block PropRiskgain 0.56 ± 0.17; t(16) = −0.44,
p = 0.67]. To summarize, a 2 valence (gain, loss) × 2 action
(GoRiskier, NogoRiskier) ANOVA with PropRisk as dependent
variable showed a main effect of action [F(1, 16) = 5.12; p =
0.038]; main effect of valence [F(1, 16) = 11; p = 0.004]; and an
interaction [F(1, 16) = 8.98; p = 0.009].
EXPERIMENT 3bS: GO-NOGO SELECTION TASK
Participants
Data from 22 participants (mean 24 years, range 18–39; 10 male;
18 right handed) were included (two further participants who did
not understand the task were excluded).
Task
Each trial here was identical to the selection task above except
for the action by which individuals expressed their choice. Here,
for the go-nogo manipulation it was necessary to indicate in each
trial which lottery would be selected by a go and which by a nogo
response. To achieve this, the black square signaling the 1500ms
choice period appeared on one of the lotteries, and individuals
responded by either accepting or rejecting it (Figure 5A). In one
block, individuals were instructed to go to accept the lottery with
the black square (upon which it increased in size) or nogo to reject
and choose the other lottery. In the other block, individuals would
either no-go to accept the lottery with the black square; or go to
reject it (upon which it decreased in size).
The order of blocks was counterbalanced between subjects (10
participants’ first block was to go to accept the lottery with the
black square). We used a set of 32 gain trials (as above but with
4 levels of EV and 8 levels of Var), shown twice in each block
(once with the black square on the left lottery, once on the right).
Loss trials were created as above. Each block contained 64 gain
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and 64 loss trials randomly interleaved (i.e., 128 trials per block,
giving 256 in the whole session). Payment and feedback was as in
Experiment 3a.
Results
Here in each trial the lottery to be accepted or rejected could
be either the riskier or less risky lottery, such that choices
could again be parsed as either: go to accept the riskier option
(GoRiskier) and nogo to reject; or nogo to accept the riskier
option (NogoRiskier) and go to reject. For the go-nogo manipu-
lation we replicate the pattern seen in Experiment 3a: individuals
chose the risky option with losses less frequently when they had
to go to accept (GoRiskier PropRiskloss 0.49 ± 0.2) than nogo
to accept [NogoRiskier PropRiskloss 0.57 ± 0.2; t(21) = 3.1, p =
0.005; Figure 5B]. Again, this effect of action was selective, with
no difference seen in the gain trials [GoRiskier PropRiskgain 0.34±
0.2; NogoRiskier PropRiskgain 0.36 ± 0.2 (SD); t(21) = −0.8,
p = 0.4]. To summarize, a 2 valence (gain, loss) × 2 action
(GoRiskier, NogoRiskier) ANOVA with PropRisk as dependent
variable showed a main effect of action [F(1, 21) = 7.9, p =
0.01]; main effect of valence [F(1, 21) = 6.1, p = 0.02] and an
interaction [F(1, 21) = 6, p = 0.02]. These results may be most
clearly compared with those of Experiment 3a by comparing
Figures 4, 5.
DISCUSSION
Our data reveal a striking consistency in individuals’ base-level
of risk-taking, across time and task context, and around which
valence perturbed choice. This perturbation by valence was highly
context dependent, being both reversible by changing task for-
mat (i.e., more gambling for gains than losses and the reverse),
and also emerging only when valence was a choice dimension
within a decision-making setting but not as an intrinsic valence-
dependent risk preference. Furthermore, the degree to which
valence perturbed an individual’s choices differed between con-
texts, suggesting different aspects to the valence effect between
contexts. Crucially, our data provide an explanation for this
influence of valence on economic choices, founded in the likely
biological bases of reward/punishment asymmetries. The causal
data reveal a contingency between nogo and punishment that
implicate “Pavlovian” approach-avoidance processes in the per-
turbation of economic choice by valence; and such approach-
avoidance processes can also explain the context dependence in
the effect of valence.
The consistent base-level of risk-taking shown here by
individuals concurs with previous work using an assay of
risk preference (Andersen et al., 2008), although has not to
our knowledge been shown across such marked contextual
manipulations (Experiments 1 and 2). With respect to char-
acterizing the perturbation by valence, the reversibility we
see here (i.e., more gambling for gains than losses and the
reverse; Experiment 1) replicates such behavior in separate
groups, and fits with an hypothesis that valence and risk
in economic stimuli exert independent influences on choice
(Wright et al., 2012). That a valence perturbation emerges when
it features as a dimension within a decision-making setting
(Experiment 2), suggests the possibility that juxtaposing trials
of contrasting valence lends valence a greater salience as a
dimension in choice. An alternative suggested by our data is
that losses generate an avoidance response that can only be
manifested when gains are an option in the decision-making
environment.
Our data also link the influence of valence in economic
choice to a broader biological literature on valence effects, and
in particular to the neural basis of reward/punishment asym-
metries (Experiment 3). In simple instrumental tasks, a role for
reflexive approach-avoidance processes in the effect of valence
on choice is well established, with evidence for a close cou-
pling between reward and go (approach) responses, and between
punishment and nogo (avoid) responses (Breland and Breland,
1961; Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011,
2012). Here we harnessed the specific couplings between go/nogo
and reward/punishment, showing that individuals chose a riskier
option less often with losses when the instrumental requirement
was to approach (go) as opposed to avoid (nogo). This is in
line with previous correlational RT data, where RTs were longer
for losses than gains in economic choices (Dickhaut et al., 2003;
Wright et al., 2012). The observation that stimuli signaling loss
induce avoidance can explain puzzling behavior across a vari-
ety of tasks. Previous work showed that framing a sure option
as a loss can bias individuals to avoid a sure option and choose
a gamble option instead (De Martino et al., 2006), a bias also
elicited by incidentally presenting aversive conditioned stimuli
with the sure option (Guitart-Masip et al., 2010). Avoidance of
stimuli containing losses also explains a disposition not to choose
mixed gambles that contain losses along with gains (Tom et al.,
2007).
An approach-avoidance framework also helps explain the
context dependence for losses seen between our “accept/reject”
and “selection” tasks (Figure 1). Context determines animals’
responses to aversive stimuli, such that, depending on what
is called the defensive distance, rats in different contexts may
respond to threat by fleeing, freezing or even fighting (Blanchard
and Blanchard, 1988; Dayan and Seymour, 2008). Thus, we sug-
gest that in both tasks loss induces avoidance and that context
determines how exactly this is expressed. In the accept/reject task
individuals decide to accept or reject a lottery, and when it con-
tains losses they express avoidance by withdrawal. The effect of
the go-nogo manipulation was entirely consistent with this in
the accept/reject task (Figure 4), and also when individuals were
required to accept or reject an option in the go-nogo manipula-
tion in the selection task (Figure 5). However, such a withdrawal
response does not explain the valence effect in the selection
task, where individuals gamble more overall with losses than
gains.
In the selection task we previously suggested that because
individuals had to select between two lotteries, and so could
not express avoidance by withdrawal as in the accept/reject task,
instead they could potentially escape losses by selecting the riskier
option (Wright et al., 2012). Such an additional aspect to the
response to loss in the selection task (e.g., analogous to fight or to
flight) relative to the accept/reject task (e.g., withdrawal), is sug-
gested here by an observation that the impact of valence within
individuals did not correlate between tasks in Experiment 1
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(Figure 2C). This lack of correlation is in contrast both to a
strong correlation in individuals’ base-level risk-taking between
tasks (Figure 2B); and also to a consistent impact of valence
seen previously when the accept/reject task was undertaken on
2 days (Wright et al., 2012). We note such a framework can
explain context effects between our “accept/reject” task where
each trial presented a different lottery to accept or reject, relative
to the problems in the classic paper establishing Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) where each problem presented
two options for individuals to select between. It also explains con-
text effects in the same direction shown for “mixed gambles” (Ert
and Erev, 2008), and comparisons between sure options (Jones
et al., 1998).
Finally, we note that the go-nogo manipulation here did not
reveal a contingency between approach and appetitive stimulus
aspects, for example as suggested previously in RT correlations
(Wright et al., 2012). One possibility is that the threat of losses
may exert a relatively stronger effect, regarding which as noted
before an approach-avoidance account is entirely consistent with
the idea that losses have greater weight (“loom larger”) than
gains (Wright et al., 2012), and this might be usefully explored
in further work.
Our findings provide a new perspective on how losses influ-
ence economic choice. Our data show that valence perturbs
individuals’ choice about a base-level of risk-taking and that
responses to valence are highly context dependent. Further, our
data explain these findings as the result of asymmetric neural pro-
cesses related to rewards and punishments (Dayan and Seymour,
2008). These findings are not predictable under prevailing behav-
ioral economic theories (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but are
consistent with a biologically-based account of choice.
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